1. "The right of priority of payment of debts due to the Government, is a pcrogative [sic] of the crown well lmown to the common law." United States v. State Bani: of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (U.S. 1832) . But, there being no federal common law and the Government of the United States being one of delegated powers, it was necessary for Congress to accord whatever priority the United States may claim by statute. l id. Although sovereign prerogatives were in disrepute when the federal priority statute ,as enacted, it is at least arguable that under recent Supreme Court interpretations, the United States today has a statutory right of priority which exceeds the crown qrervgative recognized by the English common law of 1789. Comp are Rorke v. Dayrell, 4 Durn. & F. 402, 100 Eng. Rep. 1087 (K.B. 1791 ) (sustaining priority of senior executi.n) uith United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (19541 ("Congress has protected the federal revenues by imposing an absolute priority"). See also Seligson, Ban!ruptcy, 1950 Az:zu.u .T SuRVEY OF AmicA-z LAw 476-77 (1951) . The common law prerogative right to priority has always been understood in this country to be subject to prior liens as well as transfers of title by the debtor before the priority attached. Marshall v. New Yorl:, 254 U.S. 380, 382, 384 (1920) ; Montgomery v. State, 228 Ala. 296, 293, 153 So. 394, 39G (1934) .
2. The Government also is granted special liens for certain taxes. See statutes cited in note 93 infra.
3. "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall ex\tend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment Government as a creditor; Internal Revenue Code Section 3670 4 creates a lien on "all the property" of a delinquent taxpayer. The Section 3466 priority is not a lien ;5 it covers all debts to the Government; it is available only in the case of an insolvent debtor whose property has passed to a third person 0-. other than a trustee in bankruptcy 7 -for the benefit of creditors; and it arises at the time of this transfer. 8 The Section 3670 tax lien covers only tax debts; thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed." REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31. U.S. C. § 191 (1946). 4. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to such tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." INT. REV. CODE § 3670.
The tax lien statute appears in the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as § § 6321-3, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) .
5. See note 18 infra. 6. Section 3466 appears to contemplate a right of priority in any case where the debtor of the United States is insolvent. But the four cases particularly named-the decedent's estate, the voluntary assignment, the attachment of the estate of an absent debtor, and the commission of an act of bankruptcy-have been held to be exclusive of the situations in which § 3466 operates. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 91 (U.S. 1805) ; United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923). And, since the following section subjects "any executor, administrator, or assignees, or other person" to personal liability for failing to pay the claim of the United States first, the Supreme Court has inferred that the debtor's property must pass to some other person for the statute to apply. Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926) . The estate does so pass at the death of an insolvent debtor or a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. The burden is on the Government to show that a partial assignment is in fact a voluntary assignment within the statute. United States v. Langton, 26 Fed. Gas. 862, 864, No. 15,560 (C.C.D. Mass. 1829) . The provision for priority in the event of an attachment of "the estate ... of an absconding, concealed or absent debtor" presented no anomaly, inasmuch as such an attachment under the contemporaneous statutes of important commercial states caused an administration for the benefit of all creditors. United States v. Wilkinson, 28 Fed. Cas. 605, No. 16 ,695 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1878); McLean v. Rankin, 3 Johns. 369, 372 (N.Y. 1808) .
7. Although the fourth ground for invoking § 3466 is the commission of an "act of bankruptcy," the section now has only limited application in bankruptcy proceedings because the Bankruptcy Act prescribes its own priorities. 3 COLLIER, BAN IRUPTCY f 64.502 (14th ed. 1941) . But if an act of bankruptcy is committed without the eventuation of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, the section will apply. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 367-70 (1946) . And the section may be applicable in reorganiza- 8. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 617 n.8, 626 et seq. (1948) ; Engelman v. Commodity Credit Corp., 107 F. Supp. 930, 932 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ; State v. Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 627, 46 So.2d 553, 558 (1950) . That divestment of possession and control without technical transfer of title is enough to bring the statute into operation was settled by Bramwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926) .
It has been held that the requirement of insolvency must be satisfied as of the time of divestment, at least where the commission of an act of bankruptcy is relied on as a basis for invoking § 3466. Hofmann v. United Welding & Mfg. Co., 102 A.2d 878 (Conti. 1954) . [Vol, 63:905 it arises regardless of the solvency of the taxpayer; and it attaches at the time the assessment list is received by the collector. 0 Judicial interpretation of priority and lien legislation has been misguided, resulting in a lack of harmony between this legislation and the Bankruptcy Act.
SECTION 3466
PRIoRITY Section 3466 priority was apparently intended to apply only to unencumbered property of the insolvent debtor.
10 If the priority is violated by the third party liquidator, he is personally liable for the debts due the United States." In imposing personal liability on the liquidator, Congress could hardly have contemplated that priority payment should be made from property subject to a mortgage or other lien, which the liquidator has no right to use for the payment of unsecured debt claims.'-And, ordinarily, a statutory priority prescribes only a preference among creditors having no specific claims against property of an insolvent estate;' 1 3 it does not apply to liens held by competing creditors unless this application is made explicit by the statute. ' 4 Nothing in Section 3465 purports to change the traditional status 11. "Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays any debt due by the person or estate from whom or for which he acts, before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof as may remain due and unpaid." RPv. STAT. § 3467 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1946) .
12. An executor or administrator takes a decedent's estate subject to liens against the property. United States v. Cutts, 25 Fed. Cas. 745, 750, No. 14 
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of secured creditors by authorizing a liquidator to override a valid lien antedating the attachment of the federal priority.
'

Relative Priority of Section 3466: The Early Cases
By the middle of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court had decided six times that the federal priority did not overcome an antecedent lien.
1 The Court refused to interpret a secret and retroactive lien into the priority statute.
17 Section 3466 did not create a lien,' 8 nor did it create a "preference in the nature of a lien" with power to avoid a deed of trust previously executed to secure a guarantor.
10 Nevertheless, two early cases caused confusion as to the viability of a pre-existing lien against 3466 priority.
In Thelusson v. Smith, 20 the Supreme Court purported to rule that the priority statute defeated the "preference" of a judgment creditor holding a lien on the debtor's realty at the time of a voluntary assignment by the debtor.
The Government obtained a judgment against the debtor on duty bonds falling due after the assignment, and had the debtor's real estate levied upon and sold. The judgment creditor, relying on his prior lien, brought suit to satisfy his judgment from the proceeds of the sale. Although the Court conceded that the 3466 priority would not defeat an antedating mortgage or fien facias seizure, it held that the interest of a judgment lienor was overcome. N.Y. 1906) ; Regan v. Metropolitan Haulage Co., Inc., 127 N.J. Eq. 487, 14 A, 2d 257, 258-9 (Ch. 1940 ) ; GLENN, LIQUIDATION § § 510, 518 (1935) .
A statute which purports to create a lien in behalf of a particular creditor or class of creditors at the inception of liquidation proceedings is properly regarded as no more than priority legislation. Id. at 726. Accordingly a state-created lien which arises from the same circumstances as those generating a priority for the United States under § 3466 yields to the latter under the doctrine of federal supremacy. United States v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 201 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, 234 N.C. 595, 68 S.E.2d 263 (1951) Co., 50 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1931 ) ; First Nat. Bank v. Southland Prod. Co., 189 Okla. 9, 17, 112 P.2d 1087 , 1095 (1941 One of the justices concurring in Thelusson refused to accept the Court's e.'planation. Mr. Justice Johnson expressed his belief that the "report of the decision" had been overturned on the point supposed to be decided by it, "to wit, the precedence of the debt of the United States, as to a pre-zions judgnent, in the case of a general assignm:ent." Id. at 451. Johnson explained his own concurrence on the ground that, while the sale of the assigned property on the Government's execution was a nullity, the plaintiff judgment creditor had no right against the defendant marshal, there being want of privity between the parties. Id. at 454.
Contrary to a suggestion in United States v. Duncan, 25 Fed. Cas. 927, 932 (Pa. 1823) . 24. A respondentia bond is an obligation to repay a loan uf miney, on maritime interest, on goods laden on board a ship, upon the condition that the goods not be lost in the course of the voyage by any of the perils enumerated in the contract. The money is generally lent on the personal responsibility of the borruwer unless the parties cuntract, as they did in the Conard case, for security. See 3 Borvinm, LAw DwroNAny 2922 (Rawle's 3d rev. 1914).
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL ment for the benefit of creditors while the goods were at sea, and thereafter confessed judgment on a debt to the Government. The Government levied on the goods before the insurance company took possession, but the Court sustained the bond security as a kind of mortgage-a "transfer in presonli" of the "specific interest" in the goods at sea. 25 The opinion emphasized that a mortgage was more than a lien because it involved a transfer of property as security for a debt. 26 This rationale has led to the citing of Conard subsequently for the proposition that the Supreme Court has never decided whether the priority of the United States can be overcome by a specific and perfected lien.
27 This is a misconception of the decision in Conard: notwithstanding the Court's mortgage rationale, the insurance company had nothing more than an equitable lien, resting on the debtor's obligation to transfer the bills of lading and goods as collateral security for a contingent debt. 28 At first, the full import of Conard was appreciated by bench and bar. Six years after the decision the Attorney General conceded the holding of Conard to be that "the priority of the United States does not divest anterior liens." 2 9
And in United States v. Hack 30 the Court held that assignees of partnership property for the benefit of creditors need not grant priority to a Government claim against one of the partners as an individual. At common law each partner has an equitable lien on partnership property to have it applied to firm debts, and firm creditors are subrogated to the equity of the partners. 8 28. The outward bills of lading designated the borrower as the shipper, specified that the shipments were for his account and risk, and named a third party or his assigns as consignee. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 393 (U.S. 1828). On the outward bills of lading there were endorsed assignments, which purported to transfer to the insurance company the bills, the goods to be procured thereon, and any return cargo to be obtained by the outward cargo. But these assignments failed to effectuate a perfected transfer of legal title to the goods which were eventually attached by the Government: (1) the assignments were made explicitly for the purpose of furnishing collateral security for the contingent obligation of respondentia bonds; (2) the assignment was executed by the borrower-shipper, not the designated consignee; and (3) the goods attached were subject to homeward bills of lading disclosing no interest on the part of the insurance company. The Court acknowledged that the assignments were imperfect as against bona fide purchasers from the consignees for valuable consideration but insisted that they were good as against creditors of the assignor. the federal priority attached. The state supreme court had previously held that the personal property tax created a binding lien only on specific property against which it was assessed.3 9 Chief Justice Taft assumed that no property in the hands of the receiver had been assessed by the counties until after the federal priority arose. 4° With this crucial assumption of fact made, the counties were merely unsecured creditors. In affirming the Government's priority over unsecured claims, Spokane County squared with existing law. 41 Had the factual assumption and its significance, however, been made more explicit, the decision might have been better understood and productive of less mischief.42 But the Court's emphasis on the fact that the counties' liens were not "specific" and not "completed" by distraint, 48 inauspiciously originated the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien. The Court did not differentiate the Conard, Hack, and Brent cases. Indeed, Chief Justice Taft seemed to be oblivious of their existence.
44
Once born, the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien was nurtured in subsequent Court decisions. In New York v. Maclay, 45 the State of New York claimed a lien for franchise taxes on the property of a corporation in receivership. Although the lien, under New York law, bound the property in the hands of subsequent purchasers and took precedence over prior as well 39. Pennington v. Yakima County, 127 Wash. 538, 221 Pac. 326 (1923) ; Raymond v. King County, 117 Wash. 343, 201 Pac. 455 (1921) .
40. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93 (1929) . This assumption ignores the statement in the dissenting opinion in the court below that the proceeds of the sales of the taxpayer's assets by the receiver stood "in lieu of the specific property assessed, and the lien of the county tax . . . extended to it." Exchange Nat. Bank v. United States, 147 Wash. 176, 188, 265 Pac. 722, 726 (1928) . The Court also ignored the county's contention that its lien on the property taxed was transferred from the specific items sold to the fund in the hands of the receiver. Spokane County v. United States, supra at 80.
41, The 3466 priority outranks a state's unsecured claims. United States v. San Juan County, 280 Fed. 120 (W.D. Wash. 1922) ; In re Dickson's Estate, 197 Wash. 145, 8 P.2d 661 (1938) . In Ernst v. Guarantee Millwork, Inc., 200 Wash. 195, 93 P.2d 404 (1939) , the Washington court, appropriately distinguishing Spokane Cowuny, sustained a state personal property tax lien on the specific property assessed (actually the proceeds of its sale) as against the claim of the Government for priority.
42. See Ernst v. Guarantee Millwork, Inc., supra note 41; United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 358, 364, 28 S.E.2d 741, 743, 746 (1944 ), rev'd, 323 U.S. 353 (1945 290, 293-4 (1933) . Circuit Judge Augustus Hand had raised the ghost in the opinion below. New York Y. 'Maclay, 59 F2d 979, 931 (2d Cir. 1932 ). Cardozo's analysis followed closely that of Hand.
50. New York v. Maclay, 28 U.S. 290, 294 (1933) . Although the doctrine of the inchoate lien also received recognition in United States v. Knott, 293 U.S. 544 (1936) , the decision can stand without it. The case involved the right of the United States to assert priority in the proceeds of a deposit made by a -ew Jersey surety company as security for the payment of judgments on its himnds in Florida. The proceeds of the deposit were being administered in a state receivership proceeding for the benefit of unsecured creditors including some whose claims had no connection with surety bonds. When the federal priority attached, no Florida claimant had a judgment, a claim of lien, or any specific interest in the deposit. The Government had 6btaincd judgment against the surety company on bonds given in Florida, and had filed a claim for the aggregate amount in a state receivership proceeding. The Florida Supreme Court subordinated the Government to Florida claimants. Kelly v. Knott, 120 Fla. 580, 163 So. 64 (1935) . In view of the fact that the securities deposited remained subject to prozeis within the state, at least prior to insolvency, and that the deposit vas subject to administration for the benefit of unsecured creditors when insolvency occurred, the decision of the United States Supreme Court sustaining the Government's claim to priority over the other creditors is difficult to criticize. But cf. Conway v. Imperial Life Insurance Co., 207 La. 285, 21 So.2d 151 (1945) . 'Mr. Justice Brandeis' conclusion in Knott that the Florida creditors' interest lacked "the characteristics of a specific perfected lien which alone bars the priority of the United States" was found ten years later to concede tco much. By then the federal priority had waxed in stature and the Court explained away the concession in order to keep open the question whether a specific and perfected lien wuld bar the priority. "The statement . . . was not intended to settle the problem and may be taken to have been made with reference to the early mortgage lien cases ... ." IllinciL ex rel Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 n.10 (1946).
51. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
prior to any and all other existing liens." '5 2 The Texas court held that such a lien for state gasoline taxes, on all the propetty used in the business of a gasoline distributor, outranked both a prior mortgage and a priority claim for federal gasoline taxes.
3 The Supreme Court reversed because the state's lien was not sufficiently specific and perfected to prevail against the federal priority: the property subject to the lien was "neither specific nor constant" ;54 the amount of the claim secured by the lien was "unliquidated and uncertain" ;6 and some judicial procedure was essential to enforce the lien.5 0 52. TEx. STAT., REV. Civ., art. 7065a-7 (1936 55. The Court thought the amount uncertain because a statute made tax reports by the distributor only prima fade evidence of the amount of the tax and authorized admission of evidence of incorrectness of the report. United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 487 (1941) . Is any lien so certain that neither party can show in a judicial proceeding the incorrectness of the amount secured? In First Nat. Bank v. Southland Production Co., 189 Okla. 9, 112 P.2d 1087 (1941 , the Government attacked a ruling conferring priority on a state tax lien on the ground that the lien was not perfect and specific when the federal priority attached. Levy had been made under a warrant to enforce the state lien prior to the institution of the insolvency proceedings against the taxpayer, but the state later discovered that $656.72 was due from the taxpayer in addition to that previously reported by him. The court sustained the priority of the state tax lien even as to the latter sum.
The amount secured is frequently unliquidated and uncertain, as when the mortgage is one for future advances or contains a dragnet clause. See, e.g Pa. Super. 296, 302, 48 A.2d 210, 214 (1946) . Real estate mortgages in particular are apt to be subject to a requirement that enforcement shall be accomplished by judicial foreclosure. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 921 (1951) .
"Incredible as it may seem, the question whether a mortgage lien is entitled to priority over the United States under this statute has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court." Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, Inc., supra at 2. Presented with the question, the Alaska court acknowledged that recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on the ability of a mortgage to defeat the federal priority, but it sustained the mortgage. See United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1929 The opinion in Texas undermines the interpretation of 3466 established by the early cases. After observing that 3466 mentions no exception to its requirement of first satisfaction of debts due to the Government, the opinion noted that in Thelusson, Conard, and Brent the Court had created an exception for previously executed mortgages.57 The Court then remarked that these so-called "mortgage cases" had reserved the question of whether the federal priority would be defeated by a specific and perfected ien.ts This statement ignores the actual decisions in Conard and Brent, and rests on an apparent acceptance of Cardozo's analysis of Thelusson. These "mortgage cases" were then disposed of with an observation that, "whatever [their] current vitality, [they did not] require the subordination of unsecured claims of the United States to a specific and perfected lien." ' ' O An impressive body of authority requiring such subordination was thus reduced to a trio of misunderstood cases shadowed by a cloud of doubt.
In order to continue the expansion of the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien, the Supreme Court soon found it necessary to rule that specificity and perfection is a federal question. In United States v'. J'addill, Holland & 
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Scrutinized under federal law the landlord's lien failed to meet federal standards of specificity and perfection. 4 The Court said it was not known on the day the federal priority attached whether the landlord would assert his lien. 0 5 The amount of the rent claim secured by the lien was deemed uncertain in view of the possibility of prior payment or mistake or a right of setoff in the tenant. 6 The property subject to the lien was said to be indefinite because the landlord's lien could not be enforced against more property than necessary to satisfy the rent claim, 67 and could not be asserted against property removed from the rented premises for more than thirty days. 6 In addition to setting standards of specificity that few if any liens could satisfy, the Court confused "perfection" with processes of enforcement and collection." 0 The statutory lien was held not perfected because the landlord had not levied on the property, and because the tenant retained both title and possession." 0 The doctrine of the inchoate lien received its fullest elaboration in Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 7 ' where constructive notice to the world provided by recording a statutory lien was held not to affect a Section 3466 priority claim. Under state law, the state's lien for unemployment contributions attached to all of the employer's personal property used in his business 7 2 64. Although the City of Danville, Virginia, was not represented in the Supreme Court, its tax lien on personalty of the debtor was also subordinated to the federal priority. The state courts had accorded the city priority over the landlord as well as the Government but the Supreme Court found the city's lien not sufficiently "explicit and perfected." The Court relied strongly on an inadvertent clause in a dictum of an inferior Virginia court for substantiation of its conclusion that the city's lien was contingent. [Vol.
63:905
Notice of the lien had been filed in the office of the county recorder, validating it even against innocent purchasers for value. 3 In order to protect itself against dissipation of its security, the state sued in a state court to enforce the lien, and obtained both an injunction against creditors' interference with the property, and the appointment of a receiver. The state supreme court, however, accorded priority to a federal claim, 74 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
The lien was found not "sufficiently specific or perfected" for federal purposes. Although the lienor was identified, 7 r, and the amount of the lien was certain, 76 the property to which the lien attached was not definite. 7 7 The statutory language--"all the personal property. . . used.., in business"--was too vague and comprehensive; the property affected could not be ascertained until the debtor submitted a schedule in the lien foreclosure proceedings.
7 s In addition to this three-part test of identity, certainty, and definiteness the Court suggested that specificity and perfection required a transfer of title or possession. 
77.
Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946) . This indefiniteness was also found in the Maclay, Texas, and Waddill cases, supra note 76.
78. The filing of a complete schedule of pers ,nal prorerty subject to the lien was a duty of the debtor. ILT. REv. STAT., c. 48, § 243 (e) (1943) . Since the state would nit know the amount of property subject to the lien until the debtor had filed the required schedule, the earlier appointment of the receiver was said to be "only an initial step in the perfection of the lien, [not a final attachment,] as is, for e.-xample, the enforcement of a judgment by execution and levy"' Illinois cx rcl. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 374 (1946) . Cf. State v. Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 630, 46 So2d 553, 561 (1950) , v,-here the state court ventured its ovn version of the Supreme Court "formula or standard7 for a "specific and perfected' lien: "if the amount of it has been fixed by a proceeding which is binding and conclusive at the date of receivership, and not open for change in any sort of proceeding which might arise thereafter; and that the lien upon the property which was received by the receiver was not dependent upon any contingency, nor subject to selection, shift, or change, and nothing remained to be done then er thereafter to ma!:e such lien complete, specific or perfect, or to liquidate the debt, and nothing could be done thereafter to discharge the debt or subordinate such lien but full payment of the debt." 79. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 376 (1946 New Hampshire's highest court thought that there could be "no question" that the lien of a town property tax on machinery which had been foreclosed by advertisement and sale before the federal priority arose complied with the Supreme Court's requirements. s5 The state court was satisfied that the town's tax lien was sufficiently perfected and specific even before advertisement and sale. 14 The Government took the case to the Supreme Court, 88 where the town did not continue the battle. Without questioning that the lienor was identified, that the amount of the lien was certain, or that the property subject to the lien was definite, the Court simply pointed out that "[t]he taxpayer had not been divested by the Town of either title or possession. The Town, therefore, had only a general, unperfected lien." 8 0 What made the lien "general" is not clear.
The remarkable progeny of Spokane County subordinated statutory liens 8 to the federal claim, even though the Government had no lien. The condemned category of the inchoate and general lien, created by the Court and continually enlarged to include each new lien coming before it, has come to embrace practically every lien to be found in modern American law. 88 And in order to avoid facing the supposedly unresolved question whether a specific and perfected lien is superior to the federal priority, the Court has always been If recordation perfects a lien on a debtor's property as against every subsequently accrtuing interest under state law, these justices are apparently unable to find anything in the federal priority statute to justify a judicial ruling that the lien is still not perfected. Cf. Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement of Cal., 336 U.S. 1.18 (1949) , implying throughout that a federal tax lien had been "perfected" for the purposes of § 67b of the Bankruptcy Act by virtue of a filing of notice of the lien.
81. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 374, 376 (1946 88. Repeated references in the Court's opinions to lack of title or possession suggest that pledges, common-law liens, and even statutory possessory liens may meet the Court's standards. But both title and possession may be required despite the use of the disjunctive in the Court's references to these two features. In Gilbert Associates acquisition of a tax title without possession was insufficient to perfect the lien. To speak of a lienor with title is of course to utter a legal solecism; but the incongruities of the doctrine of successful in finding one feature suggestive of inchoateness." In 1954 the Court finally acknowledged that a lien was specific and perfected. 8 But the competing federal interest in this case was the federal tax lien, not the federal priority. To the tax lien it is now necessary to turn.
SEcTioN 3670 TAx LIEN
Evolution of Federal Tax Lien Legislation
The need for a lien to secure the Government's tax claims, irrespective of the taxpayer's solvency, became apparent as federal fiscal requirements e.-the inchoate and general lien have never been a handicap to its devehpment. In any event, even a possessory lienor probably does not hold free of all the cm-ntingencies enumerated in Waddill. See text at notes 65-8 supra.
There is occasional intimation that an actual levy may create a specific and perfcctd lien. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 3t2, 374 ( 14W. The sug'-gestion apparently goes back to a dictum, that seizure under a fieri fadas places prup rty beyond the federal priority, in Thelusson v. Smith, 2 W qeat. 396, 426 (U.S. 1817). A leiy of execution, however, need not deprive the debtor of possession. See 2 FrrEE!t.:, ExrcuTioNs 263 (3d eda 1900) (personalty); DR.KxE, ATrT.%cIENT §236 (7th eJ. M91) (realty); 2 FREEMAN., ExEcunoNs § 280a (3d ed. 1900) (same). Even when pssessi,.n is taken by a levying officer, the lien may be defeated by intervention of bankruptcy under § 67a of the Bankruptcy Act or by other circumstances before final enforcciment. 2 Hi. § § 2 71-271a. Finally, the possession taken under a levy would seem to be like that of the receiver in Campbell-possession "of the court" rather than of the liewnor. And that Idind of possession apparently does not constitute perfection. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 376 (1946) .
The six cases cited in note 16 supra, sustaining consensual liens, have nt bccn explicitly overruled; and no consensual lien has yet been subordinated by the Supreme Court on the ground that it was inchoate and general. The Court has, however, intimated that the old "mortgage cases" may now require re-examination. New Yorl: v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 4'0, 4S4, 486 (1941) Although nothing in the cases states that the nature of the property subject to a licn has aught to do with the issue of whether the lien is specific and perfected, it has smetimes been thought that a difference should be rectgnized between a lien on realty and a lien on personalty. Cf. BAr~uPTcY AcT § 67c, discussed in 4 COLLIER, BA. A:P: cV f[ 67.20[3] (14th ed. rev. 1954). The statutory liens involved in Macla;y and Texas apparently applied to real property as well as to personalty, and the Court made no effrt to limit the scope of its ruling to personalty in either case. The only hint that the nature of the property may be relevant is found in United States v. New Britain, sapra at -7, U.S.C.A. § 3670 (1940) . But substantially the same statute appeared earlier in 13 STAT.
470-1 (1865).
92. A neglect or refusal to pay after demand is a condition precedent to the inception of the lien. An ambiguity exists in the provisions for the commencement of the lien found in § § 3670 (time of demand) and 3671 (time of receipt of assessment list). See, e.g., MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540, 541-2 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Kohlmcier, Federal Tax Liens Under Revised Statutes-Section 3186, 13 TAX MAn. 191, 192 (1935) . The result has been uniformly reached, however, that the lien arises only after both requirements have been satisfied. United States v. Lias, 103 F. Supp. 341, 342 1016 (1913) . The Government has sought to have the courts read the notice-filing statute as having the effect of subordinating to the federal tax lien every hind of lien not specifically protected, regardless of the time of its attachment to the debtor's property. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 19-24, United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 31 (1954) ; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 27-9, United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953) . In subordinating liens attaching prior to the tax lien, this reading of the statute involves a misapprehension of the purpose of notice-filing legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 1018 , 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1912 . But the reading found support in the concurringopinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950) .
For the persons covered by the notice-filing provision, actual notice or knowledge of a federal tax lien has been regarded as immaterial on the question of the validity of the tax lien. United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1933 ). But, under § 6323(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, actual notice wiU be equated to constructive notice for mortgagees, pledgees, and purchasers. H.R. 8300, 3d Cong., 24 Sess. (1954) . No reference is made, however, to the effect of a judgment creditor's actual knowledge.
100. 53 STAT. 882-3 (1939) . This amendment apparently was declaratory ,f existing law. H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1939) ; cf. In re Decler's Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 340-1, 49 A.2d 714, 719 (1946) , cert. denied smb nomn. Decker v. Kann, 331 U.S. 807 (1947) ; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Davy, 13 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Oka. 1936) . Contra: Investment & Securities Co. v. Robbins, 49 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D. Wash. 1943 ), aff'd, 140 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1944 
A Trio of Troublesome Precedents
The Government lawyers who, equipped with no more than a priority stat- Supp. 193 (E.D. Mich. 1945) . Section 6322 starts the lien from the time the assessment is made rather than the time the collector receives the assessment list. Section 6323(b) nullifies state notice-filing statutes which prescribe the form or content of the federal lien notice, e.g., Mica. STAT. ANN. § 7.751 (1950) , held applicable in United States v. Maniaci, 116 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1940 ). An amendment of 1942 apparently having the same purpose proved to be abortive. Youngblood v. United States, 141 F2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944 183 (1952) . Section 6323 (c) (1) validates the lien against purchasers, mortgagees, and pledgees taking property (except securities) with actual notice of the lien. This provision overrules such literal interpretations of the notice-filing law as that in United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1938) . Section 6323(c) (2) limits the protection afforded a judgment creditor to persons with a conventional judgment, codifying United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) . Section 6323(c) (3) further limits the class of judgment creditors to those with perfected liens. Unless the word "perfected" takes on the exotic coloration of the doctrine of the inchoate lien, see United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) , § 6323(c) (3) will be in accord with the interpretation of the'present statute, INT Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946) . In addition to arguing for a 3670 tax lien, the Government sometimes proposed the application of § 3466 in situations in which it was obviously inapplicable. See 0 T In Security Bank the creditor's attachment and subsequent judgment straddled the date of the federal tax lien. The Stylianos owned realty in California. Morrison sued them on a note and had the realty attached. Thereafter, but before Morrison obtained judgment against the Stylianos, a federal tax lien arose against the realty, and notice was duly filed. Under California law, the creditor's attachment gave rise to a lien on the realty effective when recorded.' 0 8 And the California courts had held that a subsequent judgment lien merged with the attachment lien and related back to the time when the attachment was recorded.
1 9 Since the federal tax lien came after the attachment lien, the state court relegated the Government to the funds remaining after discharge of Morrison's judgment. 106. See quotation from the Government's brief in Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 1950) . For earlier references to less refined versions of the argument, see, e.g., In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808, 809-10 (6th Cir. 194S); United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1946 lien is allowed to lapse by the passage of time, the attachment lien is dissolved. 11 2 In that sense, Morrison's attachment lien was inchoate. 113 Consequently, the Government argued that since the priority of the United States under Section 3466 would not be defeated by a lien like Morrison's, the tax lien should fare no worse. And, although the tax lien statute does not subordinate or even mention inchoate liens, the Court accepted the Government's analogy to 3466.114 Since the Supreme Court had not yet found any antedating lien sufficiently specific and perfected to defeat the federal priority, the Security Bank case appeared to be a significant victory for the Government. Thirty cases in the lower courts had denied the supremacy of the 3670 tax lien over antedating rival liens without investigating inchoateness. 1 ; In applying the rule "first 112. CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § 542b (Deering 1949) . Since the three-year period had passed without any enforcement of the lien in Puissegur v. Yarbrough, supra note 111, the rights of the attaching creditor were terminated by operation of law. Few liens are not subject to the same kind of contingency.
113. The Government suggested additional respects in which the attachment lien should be regarded as contingent or inchoate: (1) the attaching creditor has no possessory rights in the property; (2) he has no title; (3) he has no priority over an antedating unrecorded mortgage; (4) his lien terminates if the debtor dies before levy of execution on a judgment; (5) his lien right may be displaced by the debtor's declaration of homestead before judgment; (6) the attachment lien may be discharged on the debtor's giving security. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 37-8, United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) . A comparable catalogue of contingencies can be drawn up for most liens. Cf. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356-7 (1945) .
114. "In cases involving a kindred matter [the § 3466 priority] ... , it has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien effective to protect the lienor against others than the Government, but contingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it ....
If the purpose of the ... collection of taxes due the United States from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here." United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950) . Mr. Justice Jackson concurred separately. Id. at 51-3. He read the history of the federal tax lien to give the lien priority over every adverse interest except those protected by notice-filing, and stated that since an attachment lienor was not "a judgment creditor in the conventional sense," he was not entitled to protection. in time, first in right," these courts had treated the federal tax lien the same as any other legal lien having no special priority. 110 Since none of these cases was brought to the Court's attention in any brief, or mentioned in the opinion, the Court may not have realized how far Security Bank departed from the traditional interpretation of 3670."
17
In any event, the Government encountered obdurate resistance in its efforts to exploit the implications of Securi y Bank. 118 In spite of the seemingly un-attainable standards for the specific and perfected lien erected by Supreme Court opinions construing Section 3466, lower courts bad little difficulty in finding these standards satisfied by liens competing with a federal tax lien.
110
They also avoided Security Bank by characterizing state-created interests in such a way as to bring their owners within the protection of the notice-filing provision. 120 In Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 21 the New Hampshire Supreme Court used both devices to sustain the superiority of town property tax liens over subsequent 3670 tax liens: (1) the town's tax liens were held specific and perfected; (2) the town, by virtue of the assessment of taxes, was a judgment creditor under previous state decisions and, as such, was entitled to the protection of notice-filing. The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed on both points.' 22 The first ground failed because the town lacked possession or title. 123 The second ground failed because only a judg-ment creditor "in the usual, conventional sense" is comprehended within the restricted list of beneficiaries of notice-filing m4
Despite the Government's victory, Gilbert Associates casts doubt on Security Bank's application of the doctrine of the general and inchoate lien to Section 3670 cases. Since the debtor was in receivership, the Government asserted both a 3670 tax lien and a 3466 priorityY m If, as Security Bank indicated, the doctrine is engrafted on 3670, the Court could have held for the Government on both grounds. But the Court based its decision solely on the Government's 3466 priority, r '3 revealing perhaps a sense of insecurity about Security Bank. In any event, the lethal effects of the doctrine were mitigated in United States v. New Britai, 1 27 where the Supreme Court found a specific and perfected lien for the first time.
New Britain presented the logically insoluble puzzle of liens caught in a circuity, of priority.
2 8 Federal tax liens were inferior to two mortgages and a judgment lien, which had attached before notice of the federal liens was filed; but the federal tax liens were superior to subsequent city liens, for taxes and water charges. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors sawv nothing
Associates. No defect in the town's lien was suggested other than its failure to reduce the property to possession. This single deficiency, however, sufficed to render the lien both "general" and "inmperfected." Id. at 366.
124. Id. at 364. And see note 104 supra. 125. After lower courts and commentators had expressed considerable doubt about the applicability of Section 3466 to tax claims, the Supreme Court settled the question in the affirmative. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926) .
126. The Court inadvertently included a dictum in its originally filed opinion that if only the federal lien statute were involved, "priority would depend upon the dates the liens arose." United States v. Gilbert Associates, 73 Sup. Ct. 704 (ad'. op., 1953) . The dictum was deleted in the official report. But the dictum was relied on in United States x. Albert Holman Lumber Co., 206 F2d 685, 689 (5th Cir. 1953) . When the deletion vas called to the attention of the Fifth Circuit in a petition for rehearing, it amended its opinion but adhered to its original decision. 203 F.2d 113. 127. 347 U.S. 81 (1954) . 128. The circuity problem was also present in United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 4S0 (1941) . The proceeds of the sale of the debtor's property in the hands of the receiver were insufficient to pay any one of the rival claimants-United States, state, or mortgagee-in full. The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the provision of the Texas statute making the occupation tax on gasoline "a preferred lien, first and prior to any and all other existing liens . .. regardless of the time such liens originated," was constitutional and must be given effect. State v. Nix, 134 Tex. 476, 133 S.WV2d 963 (1939) . Accordingly the mortgages were subordinated to the state's lien. And since the federal priority could not be ranked above the state's lien without nullifying the state statute, nor above the mortgage without -violating federal law, the Government was relegated to the third rung. 138 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Since only the Government sought United States Supreme Court review of the state court determination in favor of the Texas tax lien, the Court declined to decide the relative rights of the mortgagee as against the Government. On remand, the Texas court saw no alternative tu turning over the entire proceeds to the United States, thus freezing out the prior mortgage. State v. Nix, 159 SAV.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) . The court, however, could have followed federal policy, finding the mortgage superior to the federal priority, but appropriating the funds set aside for the mortgage to the pa)ment of the state tax lien. 1954] in the Security Bank case requiring disregard of the "principle ordinarily applicable to the determination of priority of incumbrances, namely, first in order of time, first in right.' 2 ' But it found it impossible to apply the ordinary rule in the circuity situation presented, because under Connecticut law the mortgages and the judgment lien were inferior to the city's liens. A disposition which would prefer the federal tax liens to those of the city would violate state law if the order of distribution were (1) mortgages and judgment lien, (2) federal liens, (3) city liens; or would violate federal law if the order were (1) federal liens, (2) city liens, (3) mortgages and judgment lien. The solution of the Connecticut court was to find a congressional intent to subordinate federal liens not only to mortgages and judgment liens but also to other encumbrances superior to mortgages and judgment liens.
180 Accordingly, it approved distribution of the proceeds in the following order: (1) city liens, (2) mortgages and judgment lien, (3) federal liens. The Government appealed, challenging the rule of "first in time, first in right." The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, but vacated the Connecticut judgment because the rule had not been applied. 131 The Court suggested that the United States was not concerned with the relative priority among the city, the mortgagee, and the judgment creditor, provided that the Government's claim was subordinated only to an amount equal to the claims of the mortgagee and judgment creditor. 13 2 Impliedly, on remand the state court may follow state policy and appropriate the funds set aside by the Supreme Court for the mortgagee and judgment creditor to the payment of the city liens.
18 3 Such an allocation, however, would violate the federal policy of protecting the mortgagee and judgment creditor from the impact of 3670.
Although the Government did not defeat the city liens, the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien still survives. The Government relied on Security Bank and Gilbert Associates to defeat all the city liens. The Court accepted Security Bank's application of the doctrine to 3670 litigation. S. 81, 88 (1954) . 133. The Government suggested that the problem of circuity could be solved by setting aside enough of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to pay the mortgage liens and the judgment before satisfying the Government. The priority of the city could then be preserved by paying its liens from the sum so set apart. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 17, United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) . The resulting disposition would compel the mortgagee and judgment creditor, who are explicitly protected as against the United States by § 3672, to submit to a compression of their liens between those of the city and the United States. To the extent of the city's liens denied priority over the federal liens, the mortgagee and the judgment creditor would thus be postponed to both the federal liens and the city's liens. The Government obliquely acknowledged the incongruity but blamed it on the state law.
134 140. The Court's contrast of the "absolute priority" when the debtor is insolvent with the failure of Congress "to expressly provide for federal priority" in the absence of insolvency also suggests that the Court thinks of 3466 as the more powerful preference.
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87 (1954) . 1954] three interests expressly protected from a 3670 lien-the mortgage, judgment lien, and pledge-may be unable to withstand the 3466 priority.
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT: CONGRESSIONAL SIGNPOST ON THE PRIORITY ROAD
The disparity between the treatment of federal claims in bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy liquidations 142 reveals how far the doctrine of the inchoate lien has led the courts astray. The Bankruptcy Act is equipped with its own system of priorities among unsecured creditors. In situations where the question is whether a particular debtor enterprise should be permitted to continue rather than be liquidated, Congress has taken into account the peculiar position of the Government as an inevitable future creditor. In railroad reorganizations, corporate reorganizations generally, and real property arrangements, the debtor's property shall be free and clear of all claims, including liens, of creditors except such as may otherwise be provided for in the plan or appropriate judicial order. See BANKRUPrcY Act § § 77(f), 226, and 474. But to protect the interests of the United States as a tax and customs-duty collector, Congress has prohibited confirmation of any plan of reorganization or arrangement -not providing for full payment of any claims the Government holds in such a capacity, unless a designated official or agency of the United States accepts a lesser amount. See id. § § 77(e), 199, and 455.
Likewise, by § 337(2), the debtor in a Chapter XI proceeding for an arrangement is required to deposit enough money to pay debts having priority under Section 64a, including taxes and debts owing the United States, unless the United States shall waive such deposit. Chapter XIII, authorizing wage earners' plans for composition or extension, requires full payment of debts entitled to priority under § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, in- [Vol. 63:905
FEDERAL PRIORITY
claims are on the fourth of a five-rung ladder of priority. 4 4 Section 3466, a priority created by a law of the United States, is on the fifth rung. 4 5 In bankruptcy proceedings, the Government can assert no priority over state or local bodies for unsecured tax claims,' "16 and all such claims are ranked below the three rungs of administrative costs and expenses, wages, and certain creditors' expenses. And Government nontax claims on the fifth rung are further subordinated to state and local tax claims on the fourth rung. Moreover, the bankruptcy priorities among unsecured creditors are not honored until lien creditors have been satisfied. 147 And the Bankruptcy Act is more solicitous toward inchoate and general liens than the Supreme Court has been in nonbankruptcy proceedings. The Chandler Act of 1938 favored the inchoate and general statutory lien: these liens may be perfected after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and when perfected, they must be paid in full before all unsecured claims, including those of the Government. 48 In the situations in which statutory liens may not be perfected, or their holders are limited in the amount of preferred recovery, 1 9 the Government is an incidental rather than an intended beneficiary. These restrictions were intended primarily to protect all general creditors from state-created liens thought to bear similarity to the state-created priorities that had been nullified for bankruptcy purposes by the Chandler Act. L 'G If the policy of the Bankruptcy Act is sound, it should be followed in other liquidations involving federal claims. 15 1 The argument for elimination of the disparity between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy distributions involves more than an academic concern for theoretical consistency.
15 2 Bankruptcy legislation reflects a deliberate congressional choice not to accord the federal priority the kind of treatment which the Supreme Court has said is necessary to insure prompt and certain collection of debts due to the United States.
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Judicial legislation is not only arbitrary in this sense, but it also tends to increase the number of bankruptcy petitions at the instance of creditors who fare better under the bankruptcy rules of distribution. -'And when bankruptcy is not available, 5 4 the spectacle of liquidations proceeding side by side--one affording the Government priority over liens as well as unsecured claims, and the other denying such priority-defies rational justification for the discrimination.
CONCLUSION
There is little reason to hope that the Supreme Court will retreat from the position it has taken in respect to the Section 3466 priority or, indeed, that it will not continue to extend the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien to envelop all liens in nonbankruptcy liquidations of insolvent estates. The 3466 priority must be amended 155 to remove the excrescence of the inchoate and general lien and to restore the original legislative intent, except insofar as congressional policy has been modified by relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. A statute which would effectuate these objectives follows:
FEDERAL PRIORITY Section I. Priority established: When an insolvent debtor of the United States is divested of the title, possession, or both title and possession of
